Almost Heaven
Well-known
Hezbollah was seen as so powerful that any war with the group would be devastating for Israel. In past years the description of war with Hezbollah always made it seem almost apocalyptic. It would mean civilians in shelters across the country for days or weeks on end. It would mean widespread destruction. Large numbers of casualties were predicted.
The Hezbollah bogeyman was conjured up because of fears of what a major conventional-style war would mean This model for what war would look like emerged slowly. It wasn’t typical in the years after the 2006 war. Instead, in the years after 2006 the main concern was that Hezbollah had proven itself tougher to fight than Israel assumed. The IDF had to put in place reforms for the ground forces after the war. Training was key, to shift the IDF from fighting terrorism in the West Bank, to return to a conventional military force.
The fear of another 2006 war haunted Israel, and soon fear became an over-arching narrative that Hezbollah was some kind of all-powerful monster. Hezbollah increased its capabilities and it became typical to talk of the group possessing 150,000 or 200,000 rockets. Soon, the rocket arsenal also came to include precision guided munitions. In the last year or two it became clear the group had also acquired thousands of drones.
Iran also used Hezbollah to expand its own concept of a multi-front or multi-arena war. This is what gave Hezbollah the sense it could get involved in the war against Israel after October 7. Hezbollah broke through any sense of Israel’s ability to deter it by beginning its attacks on Israel on October 8. Hezbollah forced Israel to evacuate the north. Fears that it could carry out an October 7 type attack led to the evacuations. In addition there was hesitancy about creating a larger war with Hezbollah. The limited proportional war began to take shape. This benefited Hezbollah.
Israel called Hezbollah’s bluff on September 23. It was able to do this by eliminating Hezbollah’s commanders in a September 20 airstrike. In addition Israel was able to accomplish this via other means. The exploding pagers hurt Hezbollah and caused numerous casualties.
Hezbollah struggled to respond, but it found itself in chaos. Hezbollah was seen as a major bogeyman but it’s possible it never put in place an ability to launch thousands of rockets a day. Hamas had achieved this on October 7. Hezbollah may not have actually been able to do what Hamas did. In addition, the chaos that emerged after September 18 also enabled Israel to increase its strikes on Hezbollah launchers. The lessons of August 25, when Hezbollah sought to launch thousands of projectiles at Israel, also helped Israel understand how Hezbollah would react.
The overall story here is that Hezbollah became arrogant and complacent. It also came to overly rely on Iran and Iran’s multi-front strategy. This reined in Hezbollah. This restrained Hezbollah and turned it into a kind of secondary front for Iran. Iran wants to preserve Hezbollah and therefore it is afraid of Hezbollah entering a major war. This left Hezbollah open to the kinds of attacks it suffered from September 17 to September 23.
It's possible Hezbollah will be able to get its house in order and carry out large scale attacks on Israel. It’s possible Iran will enter the conflict or push the Houthis to increase attacks. Many things can happen in war. Once you decide to go to war, there is contact with the enemy and one cannot know how the war will unfold. Israel will also have to decide what to do. Israel shaped the battlefield in strikes on September 20 to September 22. That is why September 23 will ring out as a major shift in this conflict. Israel has sought to turn the tide on the Iranian-backed terrorist group. It has called Iran’s bluff and pushed away the bogeyman of Hezbollah. Now the sum of all our fears about Hezbollah’s capabilities have been deflated a bit.
I drove along the border of northern Israel on September 23 and expected to see wide ranging Hezbollah rocket fire. I expected to see the enemy launch anti-tank guided missiles along the border. As I drove home at sunset, after most of Israel’s 1,300 airstrikes had been carried out, I saw numerous barrages of Hezbollah rockets over my head. However, it appeared that Hezbollah’s capabilities to launch its arsenal of rockets had been degraded to a similar level that Hamas had in October 2023. It’s still a major threat, but the fear of Hezbollah has now diminished.
www.jpost.com
The Hezbollah bogeyman was conjured up because of fears of what a major conventional-style war would mean This model for what war would look like emerged slowly. It wasn’t typical in the years after the 2006 war. Instead, in the years after 2006 the main concern was that Hezbollah had proven itself tougher to fight than Israel assumed. The IDF had to put in place reforms for the ground forces after the war. Training was key, to shift the IDF from fighting terrorism in the West Bank, to return to a conventional military force.
The fear of another 2006 war haunted Israel, and soon fear became an over-arching narrative that Hezbollah was some kind of all-powerful monster. Hezbollah increased its capabilities and it became typical to talk of the group possessing 150,000 or 200,000 rockets. Soon, the rocket arsenal also came to include precision guided munitions. In the last year or two it became clear the group had also acquired thousands of drones.
Hezbollah's weaponry
This huge arsenal painted a picture of a war in which thousands of rockets would rain down across Israel, threatening most of the country. This is because Hezbollah was assumed to have a large number of long range rockets as well. Hezbollah benefited from the Syrian civil war. Even though it suffered losses in Syria due to its involvement from 2012 to 2018, it also achieved a lot in Syria. Its fighters gained experience fighting as a conventional ground force. It also was able to penetrate Syria deeply and knit itself in with other Iranian-backed militias. Hezbollah sought to expand the threat to Israel to include the Syrian side of the Golan.Iran also used Hezbollah to expand its own concept of a multi-front or multi-arena war. This is what gave Hezbollah the sense it could get involved in the war against Israel after October 7. Hezbollah broke through any sense of Israel’s ability to deter it by beginning its attacks on Israel on October 8. Hezbollah forced Israel to evacuate the north. Fears that it could carry out an October 7 type attack led to the evacuations. In addition there was hesitancy about creating a larger war with Hezbollah. The limited proportional war began to take shape. This benefited Hezbollah.
Israel called Hezbollah’s bluff on September 23. It was able to do this by eliminating Hezbollah’s commanders in a September 20 airstrike. In addition Israel was able to accomplish this via other means. The exploding pagers hurt Hezbollah and caused numerous casualties.
Hezbollah struggled to respond, but it found itself in chaos. Hezbollah was seen as a major bogeyman but it’s possible it never put in place an ability to launch thousands of rockets a day. Hamas had achieved this on October 7. Hezbollah may not have actually been able to do what Hamas did. In addition, the chaos that emerged after September 18 also enabled Israel to increase its strikes on Hezbollah launchers. The lessons of August 25, when Hezbollah sought to launch thousands of projectiles at Israel, also helped Israel understand how Hezbollah would react.
The overall story here is that Hezbollah became arrogant and complacent. It also came to overly rely on Iran and Iran’s multi-front strategy. This reined in Hezbollah. This restrained Hezbollah and turned it into a kind of secondary front for Iran. Iran wants to preserve Hezbollah and therefore it is afraid of Hezbollah entering a major war. This left Hezbollah open to the kinds of attacks it suffered from September 17 to September 23.
It's possible Hezbollah will be able to get its house in order and carry out large scale attacks on Israel. It’s possible Iran will enter the conflict or push the Houthis to increase attacks. Many things can happen in war. Once you decide to go to war, there is contact with the enemy and one cannot know how the war will unfold. Israel will also have to decide what to do. Israel shaped the battlefield in strikes on September 20 to September 22. That is why September 23 will ring out as a major shift in this conflict. Israel has sought to turn the tide on the Iranian-backed terrorist group. It has called Iran’s bluff and pushed away the bogeyman of Hezbollah. Now the sum of all our fears about Hezbollah’s capabilities have been deflated a bit.
I drove along the border of northern Israel on September 23 and expected to see wide ranging Hezbollah rocket fire. I expected to see the enemy launch anti-tank guided missiles along the border. As I drove home at sunset, after most of Israel’s 1,300 airstrikes had been carried out, I saw numerous barrages of Hezbollah rockets over my head. However, it appeared that Hezbollah’s capabilities to launch its arsenal of rockets had been degraded to a similar level that Hamas had in October 2023. It’s still a major threat, but the fear of Hezbollah has now diminished.
A turning point in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict - analysis
It’s possible Iran will enter the conflict or push the Houthis to increase attacks. Many things can happen in war.
www.jpost.com
