Ukraine is slowly losing the three-year conflict on the battlefield. Russia is slowly losing the economic conflict at a roughly equal pace. The Kremlin’s oil export revenues are too low to sustain a high-intensity war and nobody will lend Vladimir Putin a kopeck.
Russia’s overheated, military-Keynesian war economy looks much like the dysfunctional German war economy of late 1917, which had run out of skilled manpower and was holed below the waterline after three years of Allied blockade – as the logistical failures of the Ludendorff offensive would later reveal.
Putin’s strategic victory in Ukraine was far from inevitable a fortnight ago and it is less inevitable now after the Assad regime collapsed like a house of cards, shattering Putin’s credibility in the Middle East and the Sahel. He could do nothing to save his sole state ally in the Arab world.
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Russia’s overheated, military-Keynesian war economy looks much like the dysfunctional German war economy of late 1917, which had run out of skilled manpower and was holed below the waterline after three years of Allied blockade – as the logistical failures of the Ludendorff offensive would later reveal.
Putin’s strategic victory in Ukraine was far from inevitable a fortnight ago and it is less inevitable now after the Assad regime collapsed like a house of cards, shattering Putin’s credibility in the Middle East and the Sahel. He could do nothing to save his sole state ally in the Arab world.
More
Putin’s regime may be closer to a Soviet collapse than we think
Ukraine is slowly losing the three-year conflict on the battlefield. Russia is slowly losing the economic conflict at a roughly equal pace. The Kremlin’s oil export revenues are too low to sustain a high-intensity war and nobody will lend Vladimir Putin a kopeck.
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