1LoverofGod
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Analysis:
For years, the IDF has talked about the new levels of integration between different intelligence units, and the sea, air, and land forces.
Since October 7, The Jerusalem Post has visited four different IDF locations on the southern front, two air force bases, and embedded with a navy fast boat off the coast of Gaza; several of these visits took place in recent days.
What emerged from all this begins to explain some of the IDF’s failures on October 7. More importantly, though, it establishes an understanding of how the IDF’s revolutionized and integrated approach to warfare kicked it into high gear in its offensive, and effectively changed the narrative in the war with Hamas.
Field command centers are handling real-time targeting decisions, and intelligence command centers are providing human spying, signals intelligence, satellite intelligence, cyber intelligence, and other items to the targeting centers.
During one of the targeting command center visits, an interview was interrupted for 30 seconds. During that time, the targeting commander integrated new field intelligence and seamlessly passed it on to another field or air unit – within minutes, Hamas targets were destroyed.
And on the fast boat, intelligence came through that IDF Unit 401 was about to be ambushed by Hamas. This information came from an intelligence center, through a targeting center, and then to the navy, which fired around a dozen shells from a missile boat, killing the targets.
A senior air defense official presented a picture of how IDF air defense monitors look during a “normal” volume of rocket attacks – as opposed to the 3,000 rockets that were fired in a four-hour timespan on October 7.
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m.jpost.com
For years, the IDF has talked about the new levels of integration between different intelligence units, and the sea, air, and land forces.
Since October 7, The Jerusalem Post has visited four different IDF locations on the southern front, two air force bases, and embedded with a navy fast boat off the coast of Gaza; several of these visits took place in recent days.
What emerged from all this begins to explain some of the IDF’s failures on October 7. More importantly, though, it establishes an understanding of how the IDF’s revolutionized and integrated approach to warfare kicked it into high gear in its offensive, and effectively changed the narrative in the war with Hamas.
Field command centers are handling real-time targeting decisions, and intelligence command centers are providing human spying, signals intelligence, satellite intelligence, cyber intelligence, and other items to the targeting centers.
During one of the targeting command center visits, an interview was interrupted for 30 seconds. During that time, the targeting commander integrated new field intelligence and seamlessly passed it on to another field or air unit – within minutes, Hamas targets were destroyed.
And on the fast boat, intelligence came through that IDF Unit 401 was about to be ambushed by Hamas. This information came from an intelligence center, through a targeting center, and then to the navy, which fired around a dozen shells from a missile boat, killing the targets.
A senior air defense official presented a picture of how IDF air defense monitors look during a “normal” volume of rocket attacks – as opposed to the 3,000 rockets that were fired in a four-hour timespan on October 7.
More
Hamas won Oct. 7, then IDF new integrated warfare took over - analysis
For years, the IDF has talked about the new levels of integration between different intelligence units, and the sea, air, and land forces.
